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1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, increasing overlap has emerged between projects
in mainstream epistemology and corresponding projects in the philosophy of ed-
ucation. This is no doubt in part because epistemology’s focus has broadened far
beyond the post-Gettier project of analysing propositional knowledge; front and
centre on the contemporary epistemological agenda are philosophical problems
associated with (for instance) epistemic value, understanding, knowledge-how,
testimony and intellectual virtue. Unsurprisingly, many of the epistemological
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problems associated with these notions have counterparts in educational theory.
For example, just as epistemologists ask about our epistemic aims (aims we
have from a purely epistemic point of view) so philosophers of education ask
what kinds of cognitive goods and traits an education should aim at inculcating.
Thus, the matter of what makes knowledge valuable to possess—just to take
one example of many—is a matter that falls squarely within the purview of both
epistemological and educational disciplines. This entry aims to categorise and
briefly summarise a range of such overlapping projects, under the description
of the epistemology of education. While textbooks and anthologies on the spe-
cific matter of intersections between education and epistemology are relatively
scarce (though we’ve noted some examples), the literature in mainstream phi-
losophy, epistemology and education journals on the epistemological dimensions
of education is flourishing. On the basis of what we take to be the most natu-
ral dividing lines, we’ve categorised the entry into the following sections: The
Concept of Education: Epistemological Issues (Learning, Teaching Education);
Epistemic Aims of Education; Intellectual Virtues and Education; Rationality,
Critical Thinking and Education; Understanding and Education; Knowledge,
Epistemic Value and Education; and Know-How and Education.
2 General Overviews
While there are to date no monograph overviews of the epistemology of educa-
tion, there are several accessible papers that outline and engage with core issues
at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of education. Robertson
(2009) and Schmitt (2005), for instance, offer accessible perspectives on the epis-
temic aims of education, and Elgin (1999) argues that (contrary to one widely
assumed picture) the epistemic aims of education should be framed in terms
of the epistemic state of understanding as opposed to knowledge. Siegel (2004)
outlines, in particular, some of the central epistemically relevant issues in the
epistemology of education and connects these problems to recent work in social
epistemology.
Elgin, C.Z. (1999). ‘Epistemology’s Ends, Pedagogy’s Prospects’. Facta Philo-
sophica vol. 1, pp. 39-54.
Outlines and challenges as implausibly demanding the received pic-
ture of teaching and learning captured by Plato’s Teaching Assump-
tion, the thesis that since teaching consists in conveying knowledge,
you cannot teach what you do not know.
Robertson, E. (2009). ‘The Epistemic Aims of Education’ In: Siegel, H. (ed.)
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford: OUP.
Argues that an understanding of the social conditions of knowledge
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production is crucial to facilitating the educational aim of fostering
independent thinking.
Schmitt, F. (2005). ‘What are the Aims of Education?’ Episteme vol. 1, no. 3,
pp. 223 - 33
Argues that the education aim of a liberal arts education is best
understood as justified belief.
Siegel, H. (2004). ‘Epistemology and Education: An Incomplete Guide to the
Social-Epistemological Issues’. Episteme, vol. 1, pp 129-137.
Attempts to connect social epistemology and the philosophy of ed-
ucation by arguing that many or most of the live epistemological
issues concerning education are or should be of great interest to
social epistemologists.
3 Textbooks
No textbooks of epistemology of education exist as such. However, the textbooks
of philosophy of education edited by Bailey et al (2010), Blake et. al (2003),
Curren (2003), Hirst & White (1998), Siegel (1998) and Wilson (1979) contain
ample reference to epistemological issues in the philosophy of education.
Bailey, R., Barrow, R., Carr, D. and McCarthy, C. (eds.) (2010). The SAGE
Handbook of Philosophy of Education. London: SAGE.
Accessible wide-scoping guide to the philosophy of education. Di-
vided into three parts; the first part features different styles of ap-
proach to the philosophy of education, and the second and third
parts focus on historical and contemporary work, respectively.
Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R. and Standish, P. (2003). The Blackwell Guide
to the Philosophy of Education, Oxford: Blackwell.
Contains introductions to core areas of philosophy of education; in-
cludes 20 articles by distinguished contemporary scholars commis-
sioned for the volume.
Curren, R. (ed.) (2003). A Companion to the Philosophy of Education, Oxford:
Blackwell.
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A comprehensive guide to philosophical thinking about education,
including a section with epistemologically oriented pieces on teaching
and learning.
Hirst, P.H. and White, P. (1998). Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in
the Analytic Tradition, London: Routledge.
A 1700+ page collection of classic and contemporary readings on
major themes in the philosophy of education, as approached within
an analytic tradition.
Siegel, H. (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Eduaction.
Oxford: OUP.
Includes 28 commissioned articles on a range of topics in the phi-
losophy of education; two sections are devoted to epistemologically
oriented themes, including eight articles on the subtheme ‘Thinking,
Reasoning, Teaching and Learning’ and four articles on the subtheme
‘Knowledge, Curriculum, and Educational Research’.
Wilson, J. (1979). Preface to the Philosophy of Education, London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Seminal text outlining the nature of philosophy of education and
defines some of its major problems, including the value of education
and normative dimensions of learning.
4 Anthologies
Next to Kotzee (2013) few anthologies of epistemology and education exist. How-
ever, the anthologies by Carr (2005) and Curren (2006) contain many relevant
readings.
Carr, W. (2005). The Routledge Falmer Reader in Philosophy of Education,
London: Routledge.
Contemporary reader on enduring issues in the philosophy of educa-
tion; includes a section with readings on the aims of education.
Curren, R. (ed) (2006). Philosophy of Education: An Anthology, Oxford: Black-
well.
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Comprehensive anthology that includes, along with contemporary
readings, classical readings by such figures as Plato, Aristotle,
Isocrates, Locke, Rousseau, Mill, and Dewey
Kotzee, B. (2013). (Editor) Education and the Growth of Knowledge, Special
Issue of Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47 (2).
First-ever collection of papers dedicated to issues at the intersection
of the philosophy of education and contemporary epistemology. In-
cludes readings by prominent philosophers of education as well as
leading epistemologists.
5 Epistemic Concepts in Education
A number of concepts of educational import are epistemic concepts. These are
the concepts of learning – having to do with an individual’s moving from a
state of less to greater knowledge – the concept of teaching – having to do with
someone instructing another in order to bring about learning, and education –
roughly the concept of a process of bringing about learning in another inten-
tionally by teaching or other means. These epistemic concepts in particular
play a structuring role in the philosophy of education and, in its earliest concep-
tual analysis phase (associated with the work of, for instance, Peters, Hirst and
I. Scheffler), philosophy of education focussed mainly on the analysis of these
three concepts. Here, we write, of course, of learning, teaching and education
as epistemic concepts and an important question is whether learning, teaching
and education are firstly, or only, epistemic concepts. Some point out that, in
addition to learning, teaching and educating (for) knowledge, much educational
effort is also directed at learning, teaching and educating (for), for instance,
moral or political values, aesthetic appreciation and so forth. The dispute may
be over whether the concepts learning, teaching and education belong firstly to
epistemology or to ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, etc. One may allow
that the concepts in question can be usefully studied by multiple areas of phi-
losophy. This is the approach of those who distinguish education’s cognitive
from its moral, aesthetic, economic, etc. aims. Alternatively, one may wish to
insist that the concepts in question are at root epistemic concepts in that, even
when pertaining to morals, aesthetics or economics, they still have to do with
the increase of moral, aesthetic or economic knowledge or understanding on the
part of the learner.
5.1 Learning
Probably the most general concept in the area is that of learning. A number
of sources (e.g. I. Scheffler (1965) and Hamlyn (1967)) point out that one
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ordinary sense of the word ‘learning’ is coming to know truths. One fertile area
of discussion concerns whether learning, properly speaking, requires more than
knowing truth; Hamlyn, for instance, is opposed to calling rote learning of facts
‘learning’. Important distinctions in the area are between (1) learning that comes
about as the consequence of teaching, and learning that occurs independently
and (2) learning that something is the case and learning how to do something.
Winch (1998) and Cigman and Davis (2009) provide book-length treatments of
contemporary approaches to the concept of learning. Hager (2005) and Luntley
(2005 and 2008) provide critical accounts, holding that learning is not primarily
about knowledge of propositions (Hager 2005) or theory-formation (Luntley
2005 and 2008). Davis (2010) focuses on classroom applications.
Cigman, R. and Davis, A. (2009). New Philosophies of Learning. Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell.
Significant volume exploring recent philosophical approaches
to learning. Notable especially for an exploration of what the
neuroscience of learning may contribute to the field.
Davis, A (2010). ‘Learning’, in Bailey, R., Barrow, R., Carr, D. and McCarthy,
C. (eds)The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education. London: Sage, pp.
323-336.
A handy summary of approaches to the concept ‘learning’ and to
the theory of learning in general. Divides current conceptions of
learning into ‘transfer’ and ‘construction’ conceptions.
Hager, P. (2005). ‘Philosophical Accounts of Learning’. Educational Philosophy
and Theory, vol. 37, no.5, pp. 649 - 666.
Provides an overview of the contrasts between some main philosoph-
ical theories of learning. Seeks to challenge what it calls dominant
understanding of learning, in particular that learning is an individual
activity and results in knowledge of propositions.
Hamlyn, D. (1967). ‘The logical and psychological aspects of learning’, in Peters,
R.S. (ed) The Concept of Education, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 24-
43.
Considers the relationship between the psychological analysis of pro-
cesses of learning and the logical analysis of concepts. Sets require-
ment for learning, properly speaking, to go beyond rote-learning and
to encompass understanding and application of principles.
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Luntley, M. (2005). ’The Character of Learning’, Educational Philosophy &
Theory, vol 37, No. 5, pp. 689-704.
Contrast learning as the acquisition of theoretical knowledge and
learning as the development of ‘insight’. Rejects learning as a pro-
cess of general theory formation (and criticises, in passing, popular
theory-formation views of child development). Gives an account of
insight as the focussing of attention on a particular case.
Luntley, M. (2008). ‘Conceptual Development and the Paradox of Learning’,
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol 42, No. 1, pp. 1 – 14.
Discusses Fodor’s ‘paradox of learning’ (to the effect that the most
plausible account of learning new concepts presupposes that the
learner already understands the concepts supposed to be learned).
Provides a solution to the paradox to the effect that there can be
a form of discrimination of particulars before proper conceptual dis-
crimination. Gives special importance to the affective dimension of
learning.
Winch, C. (1998). The Philosophy of Human Learning. London Routledge.
Significant book-length treatment of the philosophy of learning. The
book opposes seeing learning as primarily or solely a psychological
concept. In explaining the philosophical concept of learning, it re-
jects cognitivist and developmentalist accounts and seeks to build a
social and normative account of learning (based on Wittgenstein).
5.2 Teaching
Learning can come about in a number of different ways. Any person constantly
learns by experience and self-discovery. A person may learn many things by
accident, even. However, a sub-set of all learning is achieved by teaching: by
one person actively instructing another to bring about learning. One may teach
knowledge that by telling someone something – in this mode, teaching is analo-
gous to testifying. However one may also teach another know-how or practical
skill; in this mode teaching is showing (a matter to which comparatively lit-
tle attention is given in the epistemology of know how.) Some of the most
important questions about the concept teaching are whether teaching must be
intentional and what distinguishes teaching, properly speaking, from other (le-
gitimate) modes of instruction such as drill or practice or other (illegitimate)
modes such as indoctrination. I. Scheffler (1965) and Dearden (1967) provided
some of the first conceptual analyses. The account of teaching in Hirst (1973),
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that teaching involves intentionally bringing about learning in students, is ar-
guably the most influential. Passmore (1980) is critical of the intention element
identified by these authors as important. Phillips (2003) relates the concept of
teaching to the concept of learning (see discussion above).
Dearden, R.F. (1967). ‘Instruction and learning by discovery’, in Peters, R.S.
(ed)The Concept of Education, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.135-155.
Sets out the contrast between learning achieved independently and
learning achieved via teaching.
Hirst, P. (1973). ‘What is Teaching?’, in Peters, R.S. (ed) The Philosophy of
Education, Oxford: OUP,pp.163-177
Sets out Hirst’s view that teaching is a polymorphous activity and
that teaching is the activity of a teacher who intentionally aims to
bring about learning in a student. Arguably the classic account of
teaching.
Passmore, J. (1980). The Philosophy of Teaching, London: Duckworth. Chapter
2: ‘The Concept of Teaching’, pp. 19-33.
Critical of the view that teaching primarily involves subject content
and must always be intentional. Sets out a view of teaching as a
‘covert triadic relationship’ in which (1) a teacher teaches a student
something (the triadic relationship) (2) in a manner that need not
be completely transparent to both parties (covert).
Phillips, D.C. (2003). ‘Theories of Teaching and Learning’, in Curren, R. (ed)
A Companion to the Philosophy of Education, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 232-245.
Explores the link between the concept of learning and the concept
of teaching.
Scheffler, I. (1965). Conditions of Knowledge, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Fores-
man and Company. Chapter 1: ‘Knowledge and teaching’, pp. 7-21.
Sets out the view that teaching is the activity of attempting to bring
about belief in the student through rational means. The paper is
influential for what is implied by this: that indoctrination, as non-
rational instruction, is not education.
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5.3 Education
The concept education may indicate a social system organised to deliver teaching
– in this sense, education is most often associated with schooling. Alternatively,
it can refer to a process – in this sense, the concept is not that far away from
teaching. Regarding both, however, education denotes something more than
simply teaching or a system of teaching. According to Peters (1967), education
is a normative concept: if a process or experience is worthy of being called ‘an
education’ it is something that is desirable or worthwhile. Moreover, for Peters
(1967), education is a process that is morally permissible – morally impermissible
processes, such as indoctrination, cannot count as education. Next to attempts
to analyse the concept education directly, attempts have also been made to
analyse the concept of an ‘educated person’. The concept ‘educated’ has likewise
received considerable scrutiny.
Barrow, R. and Woods, R. (1988). An Introduction to Philosophy of Education,
London: Routledge. Chapter 1: ‘The concept of education’, pp. 8-20.
Investigates whether education conceptually and explores the links
between the concepts ‘education’ and ‘educated’
Cuypers, S.E. and Martin, C. (2011). Reading R.S. Peters Today. Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell.
Volume focussed on the work of R.S. Peters. Given the importance
of Peters’s work in analysing concepts in education generally, this
volume is of interest not only for an understanding of Peters’s work,
but in providing contemporary contributions to the central themes
in studying the concept education.
Hirst, P.H. & Peters, R.S. (1970). The Logic of Education, London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Outlines a concept of education as involving a desirable process and
the promotion of knowledge or understanding. Defends these two
elements against objections.
Peters, R.S. (ed) (1967). The Concept of Education, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Volume edited by Peters that contains many of the influential pa-
pers on the concept education. Also contains important papers on
teaching, learning and indoctrination.
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Peters, R.S. (1970). ‘Education and the educated man’, Journal of Philosophy
of Education 4 (1), pp.5-20
In a departure from his earlier conceptual analyses of education,
Peters holds in this paper that our contemporary conception of what
counts as an educated person is historically informed.
Siegel, H. (2008). ‘Is Education a Thick Epistemic Concept’. Philosophical
Papers, vol. 37, no.3, pp. 455-469.
Sketches an account of education as a normative epistemic concept.
White, J. (1982). The Aims of Education Restated, London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul. Chapter 6: ‘The Educated Person’, pp.121-139.
Presents an argument that the educated person is one who can de-
termine their own ends in life and, thereby, flourish.
Wilson, J. (1979). Preface to the Philosophy of Education, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul. Chapter 1: ‘Education – the Words and the Enterprise’, pp.15-43.
Defends the importance of conceptual analysis of educational terms.
Distinguishes institutional, activity and subject senses of the concept
education.
6 Epistemic Aims Of Education
The aims of education are often characterised in terms of certain kinds of epis-
temic goods. But what particular goods an education should aim to foster
remains an important area of debate in the epistemology of education, and one
which has attracted the interest of epistemologists working on the closely con-
nected issue of what epistemic states (and cognitive abilities or virtues) are the
most epistemically valuable ones to achieve, and why. Perhaps the most famous
discussion of the epistemic aim of education features in Plato’s classic discussion
in the Republic of the Allegory of the Cave, an aim--pursued by metaphor--that
might be best understood as an epistemic process. By contrast, Goldman (1999)
characterises the aim of education in terms of, and by comparison with a tradi-
tional line of thinking in the philosophy of science, the production of knowledge.
It follows, on Goldman’s approach, that the educational value of the cultivation
of certain dispositions or traits are always only of instrumental educational value,
relative to the goal of knowledge-production. While Adler (2003) attempts to
develop and defend Goldman’s knowledge account further, Siegel (2003; 2005)
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and Baehr (2013) represent two importantly different strategies of departure
from Goldman’s knowledge account. On Siegel’s view, critical thinking—and,
more generally, reasoning—is an ability an education should aim to foster inde-
pendently of any connection between critical thinking and truth or knowledge.
On Siegel’s view, critical thinking can be viewed as supplanting knowledge as
what is fundamental or basic vis-a-vis the aim of an education. Baehr (2013)
departs from the knowledge account by, like Siegel, focusing on the value of cul-
tivating disposition as opposed to states. For Baehr (2013), however, the aim of
education ought to be articulated, specifically, in terms of intellectual character
virtues, virtues that are individuated in part in terms of their characteristic
motivations (e.g. open-mindedness, intellectual courage).
Adler, J. (2003). Knowledge, Truth and Learning’ in A Companion to the
Philosophy of Education, ed. Randall Curren. Blackwell, pp. 285-304.
Holds that the aims of education are mainly epistemic in that edu-
cation should transmit knowledge. Defends such epistemic accounts
against rival accounts that the aims of education are mainly moral
aims and against sceptical accounts suspicious of knowledge and
truth.
Baehr, J. (2013). ‘Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice.
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47(2), 248-262.
Offers three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fos-
tering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness,
intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty and discusses several
pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: OUP.
Argues that the fundamental aim of education, like that of science,
is the promotion of knowledge.
Plato. ‘Turning the Psyche’, in Randall R. Curren (ed.), Philosophy of Educa-
tion: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub.
Famous extract from Plato’s Republic in which the goal of education
is characterised by appeal to the Allegory of the Cave.
Siegel, H. (2005). ‘Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman
on Philosophy and Education’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol.
LXXI, no. 2, pp. 345 - 66.
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Argues, contra Goldman’s that critical thinking is a fundamental
end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and,
further, that it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust,
that is educationally basic.
Harvey Siegel (2003). ’Cultivating Reason’ in A Companion to the Philosophy
of Education, ed. Randall Curren. Blackwell, pp. 305-319.
Defends the cultivation of reason and rationality as the over-riding
educational ideal. Holds that the educational aim of rationality
trumps other accounts (such as the aims of knowledge, happiness,
citizenship, etc.)
7 Intellectual Virtues And Education
One especially fruitful point of connection between contemporary epistemology
and the philosophy of education concerns the epistemic dimensions of intellec-
tual virtues and their place in educational theory. Baehr (2011) and Roberts
& Wood (2007) offer in-depth discussions of specific intellectual character traits
(e.g. intellectual autonomy, honesty, humility and openmindedness), with spe-
cial focus on advancing (respective) rationales for why such traits are valuable
from an epistemic point of view. Relatedly, Hare (1993) and Carter & Gordon
(2014) focus specifically on the trait of open-mindedness. Hare (1993) explores
the nature and place of open-mindedness in educational theory, and Carter &
Gordon (2014) defend openmindedness as an intellectual virtue even though,
as they argue, its status as an intellectual virtue isn’t explicable in terms of
its connection to the aim of true belief. Along with engaging with intellectual
virtues in their own right, a prevailing trend in mainstream epistemology--virtue
epistemology--has sought to illuminate knowledge, justification and other epis-
temic concepts in terms of their connection to agents’ intellectual virtues or
(more broadly) cognitive character. The virtue epistemology programme has
been, over the past several decades, well developed; Bevan (2009), Kotzee (2011),
McAllister (2012) and Pritchard (2014) apply elements of the virtue epistemol-
ogy (VE) approach to topics in education. Bevan (2009) and Macallister (2012)
both develop proposals on which virtue epistemology can be appealed to in the
service of developing a philosophical foundation for educational theory. Kotzee
(2011) explores connections between ‘thick’ virtue epistemology and education,
and Pritchard (2012) motivates the prospects for ‘extended’ virtue epistemology
for the philosophy of education.
Baehr, J. (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue
Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Defends a novel approach to theorising about intellectual character
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virtues, and provides an analysis of several specific character virtues
relevant to education, such as open-mindedness.
Bevan, R. (2009). ‘Expanding Rationality: The Relation between Epistemic
Virtue and Critical Thinking’, Educational Theory vol 59, no. 2, pp. 167–179.
Explores the pedagogical implications of taking virtue epistemology
as the philosophical foundation of educational theory; argues that
critical thinking should be expanded beyond rationalist criteria to
focus on the process of inquiry.
Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E.C. ‘Openmindedness and Truth’, Canadian Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 207-224.
Argues, that embracing openmindedness as an intellectual virtue
requires we reject epistemic value truth-monism, the thesis that a
trait’s status as an epistemic or intellectual virtue is explained in
terms of that traits connection with the aim of truth. Openminded-
ness is argued to be a virtue, by contrast, in virtue of its connection
with the aim of understanding.
Hare, W. (1993). Open-mindedness and Education. McGill-Queen’s Press-
MQUP.
Detailed study of open-mindedness and its place in education
Kotzee, B. (2011). ‘Education and “Thick” Epistemology’, Educational Theory,
vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 549-564.
Draws from insights by Siegel and Hare to propose benefits of a
‘thick’ approach to education and epistemology.
Macallister, J. (2012). ‘Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education’
Journal of Philosophy of Education vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 251 - 70
Proposes that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the
resources to critique aspects of the debates (e.g. between Hirst and
Carr) about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out
and by whom.
Pritchard, D. (2014). ‘Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Episte-
mology of Education’, Educating for Intellectual Virtues, (ed.) J. Baehr, (Ox-
ford UP, forthcoming).
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Motivates the plausibility of extended virtue epistemology, accord-
ing to which technology which is out with the skin of the subject
to nonetheless form a constitutive part of the subject’s cognitive
processes; it is then claimed that such an approach has a number of
attractive features, and some of its implications for the epistemology
of education are explored.
Roberts, R. and Woods, W. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative
Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Detailed epistemological exploration of specific intellectual character
traits such as love of knowledge, intellectual autonomy, intellectual
generosity, and intellectual humility.
8 Rationality, Critical Thinking And Education
An important tradition of thought suggests that education should be concerned
with the development of independent thinking on the part of the learner. The
philosophy of education has given much attention to the nature of the inde-
pendent thought that we wish to develop through education and efforts in this
area today are devoted to improve students ‘critical thinking’. Authors such
as Glaser, Ennis and Paul have identified basic critical thinking abilities (such
as recognising arguments, analysing them, finding and criticising unstated as-
sumptions, etc.) and proposed methods for measuring and improving students’
critical thinking. Today, the field can be said to divide between those who hold
that critical thinking amounts to facility with (formal and informal) logic and
those who identify critical thinking more closely with attitudes in thinking (such
as reflexivity, criticality, originality, etc.). Some of the most important debates
in the area centre on whether critical thinking is culturally neutral and the
extent to which philosophical logic can determine how critical thinking should
be taught. Which view of critical thinking one holds will determine what one
thinks educators should seek to develop in teaching for critical thinking. Fa-
cione (1990) provides the most widely accepted definition of critical thinking.
Sanders and Moulenbelt (2011) provide an overview of alternative definitions,
amongst them, the view in McPeck(1981) that critical thinking is not one set of
skills. Siegel (1988) is important for its attack on relativism and its championing
of critical thinking as a universal aim in education, a theme also explained in
Winch (2006). Bailin (1995) and Cuypers (2004) provide contributions to de-
bates about critical thinking’s place in education. Halpern (2014) provides a
detailed overview of the development, teaching and testing of critical thinking.
Bailin, S. (1995). ‘Is Critical Thinking Biased: clarifications and implications’
Educational Theory vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 191 – 7.
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Discusses one important challenge to the idea of critical thinking:
that the model of good thinking proposed by the critical thinking
literature is biased in terms of gender and culture.
Cuypers, S. (2004). ‘Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason’. Jour-
nal of Philosophy of Education vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 75 - 90.
Explores and criticises Siegel’s approach to critical thinking. Fo-
cusses on the Kantian justification of critical thinking in terms of
respect for persons that Siegel provides and holds that it clashes
with Siegel’s Humean view of motivation to think critically.
Facione, P. (1990). Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for
Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction. Newark: American Philo-
sophical Association.
In this influential report (commonly known as the Delphi report)
a committee of the American Philosophical Association provide an
expert consensus on the definition of critical thinking and make rec-
ommendations for its teaching and assessment.
Halpern, D.F. (2014) Thought and Knowledge: an introduction to critical think-
ing (5th edition). New York: Psychology Press.
Influential handbook of critical thinking now in its 5th edition. Par-
ticularly notable for discussion of the psychology of critical thinking.
McPeck, J.E. (1981) Critical Thinking and Education. New York: John Wiley.
In this book, McPeck voices one of the most important criticisms
of the critical thinking tradition: that critical thinking is not a col-
lection of general thinking skills, but rather a collection of subject-
specific thinking skills.
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating Reason: rationality, critical thinking and education.
London: Routledge.
In this influential book, Siegel sets out the view that the main aim
of education is to foster critical thinking on the part of students.
Siegel spends much time countering relativist and post-modern crit-
icisms and to establish that critical thinking skills are of universal
educational worth.
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Sanders, M. and Moulenbelt, J. (2011) ‘Defining Critical Thinking: how far
have we come?’ Inquiry vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 38 – 46.
Gives a good historical account of the development of different mod-
els of critical thinking.
Winch, C. (2006). Education, Autonomy and Critical Thinking. Routledge.
Analyses the relationship between autonomy and critical thinking,
to each other and to education. Explores the role of critical thinking
in morality and politics and examines the role of critical thinking in
preparing young people for autonomy.
Understanding And Education
Understanding, construed as an epistemic state (e.g. as when one understands
why something occurred, or when one counts as understanding a subject mat-
ter) has enjoyed increased attention in mainstream epistemology, especially
over the past decade. While the thought that understanding is just a kind
of (propositional) knowledge--viz., propositional knowledge of causes--has en-
joyed some popularity in the philosophy of science, this view is increasingly
falling out of fashion in epistemology. And, in fact, one reason this is so,
highlighted by Pritchard (2013) is that achieving understanding plausibly in-
volves a greater exercise of cognitive agency than does the attainment of knowl-
edge. Pritchard’s (2013) own rationale in defence of this suggestion is that un-
derstanding, though not knowledge, essentially involves cognitive achievement,
where cognitive achievement is understood as cognitive success (e.g. true belief)
that is primarily creditable to the agent’s exercise of cognitive ability or virtue.
With reference to this point, Pritchard argues that it is ultimately cognitive
achievement, and thus understanding, which is the epistemic goal of education.
Pritchard (2014) has expanded on this rationale and has suggested how extra-
agential factors can in fact be exploited in order to facilitate, in pedagogical set-
tings, the attainment of understanding. Like Pritchard, Elgin (1999) and Lynch
(2014) have reached the conclusion that understanding is by comparison with
knowledge an especially worthy aim. Elgin’s insight is that teaching should aim
to foster not merely positive epistemic standings to true propositions, but that
education should seek to bring it about that the student’s commitments mesh
to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of thought--an
aim that is better understood as one of promoting understanding than promot-
ing knowledge. Lynch (2014) reaches the view that understanding is especially
valuable by appealing to a kind of ‘neuromedia’ thought experiment; suppose
that the functions of your smartphone are miniaturized to a cellular level and
accessible by your neural network. On such a hypothesis, even if it is conceiv-
able that our knowledge can be ‘extended’ through technological means in such
a manner, Lynch suggests understanding by contrast would not come so easy.
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Finally, Smith & Siegel (2004) locate understanding, as an educational aim, in a
pedagogical setting by exploring the matter of what teachers ought to do when
understanding is achieved in the absence of belief, as when students purport to
understand a theory while not believing the theory.
Elgin, C. Z. (1999). ‘Education and the Advancement of Understanding’, In
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy’ vol. 3, pp.
131-140).
Proposes supplanting the assumption that teaching aims at the ad-
vancement of knowledge with the view that teaching aims at the
advancement of understanding, where one’s understanding is holis-
tic and a matter of how one’s commitments mesh to form a mutually
supportive, independently supported system of thought.
Lynch, M. (2014). ‘Neuromedia, Extended Knowledge and Understanding,’
Philosophical Issues vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 299–313.
This paper uses a ‘neuromedia’ thought experiment to explore two
questions: (i) to what extent does such technology put pressure on
the idea that we might have more than one conception of knowledge;
(ii) what is the value of states that fit these conceptions (or types)
of knowledge?
Pritchard, D. (2013). ‘Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education’,
Journal of Philosophy of Education vol. 47, pp. 236-47.
A continuum of cognitive agency is described, on which it is ulti-
mately cognitive achievement, and thus understanding, which is the
epistemic goal of education. This is contrasted with a view on which
knowledge is the epistemic goal.
Pritchard, D. (2014). ’Virtue Epistemology, Extended Cognition, and the Epis-
temology of Education’, Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture
vol. 478, pp. 47-66
Argues that extra-agential factors can in fact be exploited in order
to develop, in pedagogical settings, cognitive ability in a way that
facilitates the attainment of understanding.
Smith, M. U., & Siegel, H. (2004). ‘Knowing, Believing, and Understanding:
What Goals for Science Education?’, Science & Education, vol 13, no. 6, pp.
553-582.
Provides a rationale for answering the question: what is a teacher
to do when confronted with a student who says “I understand that
theory (e.g., evolution), but I don’t believe it”?.
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9 Knowledge, Epistemic Value And Education
A recent trend in mainstream epistemology, especially over the past decade, has
been a kind of ‘revisionism’ about the value of knowledge. The key strand, put
forward most notably in Kvanvig (2003) and pursued further in Pritchard (2009),
submits a negative and positive thesis. The negative thesis that knowledge is
not as epistemically valuable as ordinarily assumed--that is, that knowledge is
not (contrary to pretheoretical intuitions) epistemically valuable in a way that
mere true belief (or mere Gettiered true belief that falls short of knowledge)
is not; the corresponding positive revisionist insight is that what is distinctly
epistemically valuable is understanding, rather than knowledge. This revisionist
trend--explored and criticised in detail by contributions to the volume Haddock
et al (2009)--has direct implications for normative questions in the philosophy
of education, in particularly, by challenging the accounts of the aim of education
that give primacy to knowledge acquisition. Such an account has been defended
by Almond (2010). Hand (2009), by contrast, engages with a broader question
about epistemic value--namely the epistemic value of theoretical activities; Hand
argues that education is valuable in part because theoretical activity itself (by
contrast to the attainment of epistemic states themselves) is valuable.
Almond, B. (2010) ‘The Value of Knowledge’, in Bailey, R., Barrow, R., Carr,
D. and McCarthy, C. (eds) The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education,
London: Sage, pp. 297-306.
Considers the value of educating for epistemic goods such as knowl-
edge and wisdom. Asks whether the education system should aim to
transmit useful or, instead, worthwhile knowledge and defends the
value of knowledge in education against sceptical challenges arising
from theories of social context and identity.
Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. (Eds.). (2009). Epistemic Value.
Oxford University Press.
Features leading epistemologists on the topic of epistemic value, and
in particular, on philosophical problems connected to the value of
knowledge.
Kvanvig, J. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.
Cambridge: CUP.
This is the locus classicus in contemporary epistemology for the the-
sis that understanding is of greater epistemic value than knowledge.
Pritchard, D. (2009). ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’ in Epis-
temology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O’Hear, pp. 19-43,
(Cambridge UP, 2009).
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Defends a cognitive-achievement rationale for the distinctive epis-
temic value of understanding
Hand, M. (2009) ‘On the Worthwhileness of Theoretical Activities’, in Journal
of Philosophy of Education vol. 43, no. S2, pp.109-121
Defends an instrumentalist argument for the worthwhileness of the-
oretical activities in the service of justify education, per se.
10 Knowledge-How, Expertise And Education
In Curriculum Studies, one important debate concerns whether the school cur-
riculum should be structured around the transmission of educational content or
should focus on inculcating skills (the skills/content debate). Due to the impor-
tance of this debate in studying the curriculum, one topic in epistemology that
receives particular attention in education is the relationship between knowledge-
that and knowledge-how. Within education, the debate takes two forms. Firstly,
on the curricular ‘macro’ level, the question exists whether the curriculum as a
whole should be weighted towards theoretical subjects such as history, mathe-
matics, science and literature (content) or vocational subjects such as cookery,
carpentry, engineering or accounting (skills). Secondly, on the curricular ‘mi-
cro’ level, it is a question within many subjects what is more important to teach
– disciplinary content (in history, for instance the causes of the First World
War or the consequences of the French Revolution) or disciplinary skills (such
as analysis of historical documents or historical writing in the subject history).
Understanding what sets apart theoretical- and skills-driven approaches to both
these questions naturally invites consideration of the knowing that/knowing how
distinction and of the related concept, of expertise. Winch 2009 and Winch 2014
provides an overview of thinking about knowledge how in education and stresses
the importance of Ryle’s work on knowledge how. Next to the influence of Ryle,
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) and its ‘novice to expert model’ has been influential
in shaping educator’s views on the development of expertise. Luntley (2009) and
Winch (2010) are critical of Dreyfus’s account, with Winch (2010) emphasising
the importance of both tacit skill and explicit theoretical knowledge to knowl-
edge how. Carter and Pritchard’s (2015) exploration of the value of knowledge
how is pertinent to the question why knowledge how should be educated for and
Kotzee (2014a and 2014b) explores the implications of work on knowledge how
and expertise for professional education.
Carter, J.A. & Pritchard, D. (2015). ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value’,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Argues that knowledge-how is more epistemically valuable than
knowledge-that, and on this basis, suggests that contrary to
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reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how is not reducible to
knowledge-that.
Dreyfus, H.L. and Dreyfus, S.E. (1986). Mind Over Machine: the Power of
Human Intuition and Expertise in the Age of the Computer. New York: Free
Press.
Ostensibly about the possibility of artificial intelligence, this book
became best known in education for Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s stage
model of the acquisition of expertise. Influential especially for the
view – widely accepted in education – that expertise is tacit and
cannot be taught explicitly.
Kotzee, B. (2014a). ‘Expertise, fluency and social realism about professional
knowledge’, Journal of Education and Work, 27(2), 161-78
Criticises ability- or process-based accounts of expertise in education.
Holds that such theories depart from unwarranted scepticism about
the possibility of expert knowledge and advocates, in their stead, a
social realist conception of expertise.
Kotzee, B. (2014b) ‘Differentiating Forms of Professional Expertise’ . In Young,
M. and Muller, J. (eds) Knowledge, Expertise and the Professions. London:
Routledge.
Contrasts philosophical, psychological and sociological approaches to
expertise. Criticises the influence of Dreyfus’s stage model in educa-
tion and develops an account (drawing on work by Harry Collins) to
articulate the importance of explicit and tacit knowledge to different
forms of expertise .
Luntley, M. (2009). ‘Understanding Expertise’. Journal for Applied Philosophy,
vol 26 No. 4, pp.356-70
Luntley attacks the view (associated with Dreyfus and others and
influential in professional education) that the knowledge of experts
is qualitatively different from the knowledge of novices. Holds that
what sets experts apart is rather the expert’s greater capacity to
learn.
Winch, C. (2009). ‘Gilbert Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Voca-
tional Education’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 1, pp.88-101.
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Winch applies and defends a Rylean approach to knowing how in
the educational context.
Winch, C. (2010). Dimensions of Expertise. London: Continuum.
In this book, Winch discusses approaches to expertise in professional
and general education.
Winch, C. (2014). ‘Know-how’ and Knowledge in the Professional Curriculum’.
In Young, M. and Muller, J. (eds) Knowledge, Expertise and the Professions.
London: Routledge.
Considers, broadly, whether professional education should employ
a curriculum that prioritises theoretical knowledge or learning out-
comes. Sketches an account of professional education according to
which subject knowledge and practical knowledge (or know that and
know how) contribute together to ‘epistemic ascent’ from novice-
hood to expertise.
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